Abstract. A (k; n)-robust combiner for a primitive F takes as input n candidate implementations of F and constructs an implementation of F, which is secure assuming that at least k of the input candidates are secure. Such constructions provide robustness against insecure implementations and wrong assumptions underlying the candidate schemes. In a recent work Harnik et al. (Eurocrypt 2005) have proposed a (2; 3)-robust combiner for oblivious transfer (OT), and have shown that (1; 2)-robust OT-combiners of a certain type are impossible.
Introduction
Many cryptographic schemes are based on unproven assumptions about the difficulty of some computational problems. While there exist assumptions whose validity is supported by decades of research (e.g., factoring or discrete logarithm), many new assumptions offering new possibilities are being proposed in literature, and it is unclear how to decide which assumptions are trustworthy. Therefore, given multiple implementations of some cryptographic primitive, each based on different assumptions, it is often difficult to decide which implementation is the most secure one.
Robust combiners offer a method for coping with such difficulties: they take as input multiple candidate schemes based on various assumptions, and construct a scheme whose security is guaranteed if at least some candidates are secure. That is, the resulting scheme is secure as long as sufficiently many of the assumptions underlying the input candidates are valid. This provides tolerance against wrong assumptions since even a breakthrough algorithm for breaking one (or some) of the assumptions does not necessarily make the combined scheme insecure.
Actually, the concept of robust combiners is not new, and many constructions of this type have been used in various cryptographic schemes to improve the security guarantees, e.g., cascading of block ciphers. However, a rigorous study of robust combiners was initiated only recently [Her05, HKN
+ 05]. More formally, a (k; n)-robust F -combiner is a construction which takes as input n implementations of a primitive F , and yields an implementation of F which is guaranteed to be secure as long as at least k input implementations are secure. Robust combiners for some primitives, like one-way functions or pseudorandom generators, are rather simple, while for others, e.g., for oblivious transfer (OT), the construction of combiners seems considerably harder. In particular, Harnik et al. [HKN + 05] show that there exists no "transparent black-box" (1; 2)-robust OT-combiner. In the same paper they propose also a very simple and efficient (2; 3)-robust OT-combiner.
Contributions.
We propose stronger and more general definitions of robust combiners for two-party primitives, which enable a more fine-grained approach to the design of combiners. In particular, the new definitions capture scenarios where in the candidate implementations the security of Alice is based on an assumption different from the assumption underlying Bob's security, or where the security of one party is unconditional. This finer distinction can then be exploited in constructions of combiners.
For this new definition we propose OT-combiners yielding secure OT when the total number of candidates' failures on either side is strictly smaller than the number of candidates. In particular, we propose an OT-combiner which guarantees secure OT even when only one candidate is secure for both parties, and every remaining candidate is insecure for one of the parties. Moreover, we propose also an efficient uniform OT-combiner, i.e., a single combiner which is secure simultaneously for a wide range of candidates' failures.
We show also that the proposed combiners are optimal in terms of achieved robustness. Specifically, we prove the impossibility of black-box OT-combiners achieving better robustness, and also we show that any (possibly even nonblack-box) OT-combiner achieving better robustness would in fact implement OT from scratch. This is in contrast to the impossibility proof from [HKN + 05] where only the existence of transparent black-box combiners was excluded. However, our impossibility results are not directly comparable with the previous one: on one hand our results are stronger, since they are not limited to the transparent black-box combiners, but on the other hand they are weaker, since they exclude a primitive which is stronger then the one considered in [HKN + 05] (cf. Section 3).
Finally, since our definition is stronger than the previous definition, all constructions satisfy also the latter, and as a corollary we obtain also tight bounds for the previous definition. [BB06] studied the efficiency of combiners for collision resistant hash functions. In [MP06] robust combiners for private information retrieval were proposed, and also cross-primitive combiners have been studied. Such combiners can be viewed as generalized reductions between primitives, and their study, in addition to be of practical value, offers insights into relations between cryptographic primitives.
The problem of strengthening imperfect oblivious transfer, which is closely related to OT-combiners (see below), was first considered by [CK88] , and has been studied in many subsequent works (e.g., [BCW03, Cac98, DFSS06] Organization. In the next section we review the primitives used in the rest of the paper, and present generalized definitions of robust combiners for twoparty primitives. Then in Section 3 we propose combiners for oblivious transfer tolerating an insecure minority, and prove that they achieve optimal robustness. In Section 4 we exploit the symmetry of oblivious transfer to obtain uniform OT-combiners with optimal robustness. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and discuss some open problems.
Preliminaries and Definitions

Primitives
We review shortly the primitives relevant in this work. For more formal definitions we refer to the literature. The parties participating in the protocols and the adversary are assumed to be probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines, (PPTMs).
Oblivious transfer
1 (OT) is a protocol between a sender holding two bits b 0 and b 1 , and a receiver holding a choice-bit c. The protocol allows the receiver to get bit b c so that the sender does not learn any information about receiver's choice c, and the receiver does not learn any information about bit b 1−c .
1 The version of oblivious transfer described here and used in this paper is more precisely denoted as 1-out-of-2 bit-OT [EGL85] . There are several other versions of OT, e.g., Rabin's OT, 1-out-of-n bit-OT, or 1-out-of-n string-OT, but all are known to be equivalent [Rab81, Cré87, CK88] .
Weak oblivious transfer. ((p, q)-WOT)
is an oblivious transfer with relaxed privacy guarantees for the participants [DKS99] : with probability at most p a cheating sender will learn which bit the receiver chose to receive, and with probability q a cheating receiver will learn both of the sender's input bits.
Secret sharing. [Bla79, Sha79] allows a party to distribute a secret among a group of parties, by providing each party with a share, such that only authorized subsets of parties can collectively reconstruct the secret from their shares. We say that a sharing among n parties is a -out-of-n secret sharing, if any correct shares are sufficient to reconstruct the secret, but any subset of less than shares gives no information about the secret. A simple method for -out-of-n secret sharing was proposed by Shamir [Sha79] : a party P having a secret value s ∈ F q where q > n, picks a random polynomial f (x) over F q , such that f (0) = s and the degree of f (x) is (at most) − 1. A share for party P i is then computed as
. . , z n are fixed, publicly known, distinct non-zero values from F q . Since the degree of f (x) is at most − 1, any shares are sufficient to reconstruct f (x) and compute s = f (0) (via Lagrange interpolation). On the other hand, any − 1 or fewer shares give no information about s, since they can be consistently completed to yield a sharing of any arbitrary s ∈ F [q], and the number of possible completions is the same for every s.
Bit Commitment. (BC) is a two-phase protocol between a sender, holding an input bit b, and a receiver, who has no input. In the commit phase the sender commits to bit b without revealing it, by sending to the receiver a commitment to b, i.e., an "encrypted" representation e of b. Later, in the decommit phase, the sender gives to the receiver a decommitment string d, allowing the receiver to "open" e and obtain b. In addition to correctness, a bit commitment scheme must satisfy two properties: hiding, i.e., the receiver does not learn the bit b before the decommit phase, and binding, i.e., the sender cannot come up with decommitment strings d, d which lead to opening the commitment as different bits.
Robust Combiners
In this section we recall definitions of robust combiners, and present some generalizations, which allow for a more fine-grained approach to the design of combiners. These generalizations are motivated by the fact, that in many implementations of cryptographic primitives various security properties are based on different, often independent, computational assumptions, or even hold unconditionally, and cannot be broken. Thus when designing combiners, whose main goal is to protect against wrong assumptions, it can be worthwhile to consider these security guarantees explicitly, as it can potentially lead to more efficient practical constructions (cf. [HKN + 05, MP06]). Moreover, the proposed generalizations lead to combiners which are strictly stronger than the constructions known before, and also allow for easier impossibility proofs. If the primitive for which one wishes to construct a combiner is a two-party primitive between Alice and Bob (like for example OT or bit commitment), we can make a finer characterization of the security required from the candidates. That is, we can distinguish cases when in the candidate implementations the security of Alice is based on an assumption different from the assumption underlying Bob's security, or when the security of one party is unconditional. For such candidates breaking one assumption does not necessarily imply a total loss of security (for both parties) and this property can be exploited for the construction of combiners. Note that a (k; n)-robust combiner is a special case of a (k, k; n)-robust combiner, but they are not equivalent. For example, a (2, 2; 3)-robust combiner tolerates input candidates C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , where one C 1 is secure for Alice only, C 2 is secure for Bob only, and C 3 is secure for both parties, while a (2; 3)-robust combiner can fail for such candidates. In other words, the notion of a (k, k; n)-robust combiner (and hence of a (α, β; n)-robust combiner), is strictly stronger then that of a (k; n)-robust combiner, and it provides better security guarantees. Another difference between (k; n)-and (α, β; n)-robust combiners is that for the new definition it is possible to have "non-uniform" constructions with explicit dependence on α and β. This motivates an even stronger notion of uniform combiners. For example, even if there exists a (α, β; n)-robust combiner for every α, β ≥ 0 satisfying α+β ≥ δ, where δ is some threshold, it might be the case that the combiner makes explicit use of the values α and β, and thus works differently for every particular pair values (α, β). In such a scenario more desirable would be a uniform construction, i.e., a single combiner that is secure under the sole assumption that α + β ≥ δ. In particular, a uniform combiner does not obtain the values of α and β as parameters. Since the primary goal of robust combiners is to protect against wrong assumptions, in our constructions we require that the candidates input to a combiner provide the desired functionality and the underlying assumptions can affect only the security properties (e.g. secrecy). This approach is justified by the fact that in cryptographic schemes the security is usually based on some assumptions, while the functionality properties are straightforward and hold unconditionally. Moreover, in some cases a possible way of dealing with unknown implementations of primitives is to test them for the desired functionality, hence, even if the candidate input primitives are given as black-boxes, one can test them before applying a combiner (cf. Section 3.1 in [HKN + 05]).
Definition 2 ((α, β; n)-robust F -combiner). Let F be a cryptographic primitive for two parties Alice and Bob. A (α, β; n)-robust F -combiner is a PPTM which gets n candidate schemes implementing F as inputs and implements
Definition 3 ({δ; n}-robust uniform F -combiner). Let F be a two-party primitive. We say that an F -combiner is a {δ; n}-robust
uniform F -combiner if it is a (α, β; n)-robust F -combiner, simultaneously for all α and β satisfying α + β ≥ δ. Note that the parameter δ is a bound on the sum of the number of candidates secure for Alice and the number of candidates secure for Bob, hence given n candidates δ is from the range 0 . . . 2n. As an example consider a {4; 3}-robust uniform combiner. Such a combiner is a (regular) (2; 3)-robust combiner, but at the same time it is also a (3, 1; 3)-robust combiner, i.e., it tolerates input candidates C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , where one C i is secure for both parties, and the remaining two candidates are secure for Alice only. It is not hard to see that not every (k; n)-robust combiner is automatically also a {δ; n}-robust uniform combiner with δ = 2k. In particular, the (2; 3
OT-Combiner with Secure Majority
The impossibility result for transparent black-box (1; 2)-robust OT-combiners [HKN + 05] implies directly the impossibility of transparent black-box (n; 2n)-robust OT-combiners, as from their existence would follow the existence of transparent black-box (1; 2)-robust OT-combiners. Similarly, it implies also the impossibility of transparent black-box (α, β; n)-robust combiners for α + β ≤ n. However, since (k, k; n)-robust combiners are stronger than (k; n)-robust combiners, we can show very simple impossibility results, which essentially exclude (α, β; n)-robust OT-combiners of any type 4 , that would work for α + β ≤ n: in Lemma 1 we prove that there are no black-box OT-combiners with such robustness, and in Lemma 2 we show that constructing an OT-combiner of any type (for α + β ≤ n) is at least as hard as constructing an OT protocol without any assumptions.
As mentioned previously, these results are not directly comparable with the impossibility result from [HKN + 05]: on one hand our results are stronger, since they go beyond transparent black-box combiners, but on the other hand they are weaker, since they exclude a primitive which is stronger then the one considered in [HKN + 05].
Lemma 1. There does not exist a black-box (α, β; n)-robust OT-combiner for
Proof. Assume that such a combiner exists, for some values α, β, and n such that α + β ≤ n. Let OT 1 be the trivial instance of OT where the sender sends both values to the receiver, and let OT 2 be the trivial instance where the receiver sends his choice bit to the sender, who sends the receiver the value of his choice.
Observe that OT 1 is information-theoretically secure for the receiver, and OT 2 is information-theoretically secure for the sender. Consider calling the combiner with input consisting of β instances of OT 1 and n − β ≥ α instances of OT 2 , and let OT denote the resulting OT protocol. By assumption, OT is secure for both parties. Since it is impossible to construct an OT protocol information-theoretically secure for both the sender and the receiver, there exists an adversary A (possibly inefficient), which breaks the protocol OT. By the definition of a black-box combiner, it follows that given oracle access to A one can break 2n − α − β + 1 > n "sides" of the candidates. However, since one side of each candidate is information-theoretically secure, we can break at most n sides. A contradiction.
Lemma 2. Any (α, β; n)-robust OT-combiner for α + β ≤ n implies the existence of OT.
Proof. Assume that such a combiner exists, for some values α, β, and n such that α + β ≤ n. Let OT 1 and OT 2 be trivial instances of OT, as in the proof of Lemma 1. Calling the combiner using β instances of OT 1 and n−β ≥ α instances of OT 2 as input yields a secure OT protocol without any assumption.
We will now show that the bound of Lemmas 1 and 2 is tight, by presenting constructions of (α, β; n)-robust OT-combiners for any α, β, and n, if α + β > n. First we describe a combiner, which is very simple but not fully satisfactory, as it is not efficient. Proof. The combiner is a straightforward generalization of the (2; 3)-robust OTcombiner from [HKN + 05], which is based on two "special-purpose" combiners, combiner R for protecting the receiver, and combiner S for protecting the sender.
6
The (α, β; n)-robust combiner works in two phases: in the first phase subsets of the candidates of size α are combined using the combiner R, resulting in n = n α OT schemes. Each of resulting instance is secure for the receiver and at least one is secure for both parties. In the second phase the n OTs are combined using the combiner S to yield a final scheme protecting both the sender and the receiver.
The combiner presented in the above proof is perfect in the sense that it does not introduce any additional error. However, it is inefficient in n, since the value of n , i.e., the number of OTs resulting from the first phase, would be superpolynomial in n. Lemma 5 presents a combiner that is not perfect, but efficient in n and other parameters, as required in Definition 1. In the construction we use a third-party combiner for bit commitment, which is an adaptation of a secret-sharing-based BC-combiner, due to Herzberg [Her05] , to our generalized definition. As this may be of independent interest, we describe it separately. Proof. We describe a string commitment that lets a sender commit to a value s ∈ {0, 1} m , for an arbitrary m such that 2 m > n, using n candidate implementations of bit-commitment from which at least α are hiding and at least β are binding.
The sender computes
7 an -out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing of s over F 2 m , for := n−α+1, resulting in shares s 1 , . . . , s n . Then the sender uses the n instances of bit-commitment to commit to the share s i bit-by-bit, for each i ∈ [n]. In the opening phase the sender opens the commitments to all the shares, and the receiver reconstructs the secret s.
To see that this commitment is hiding, notice that at least α shares are guaranteed to be hidden from the receiver, since at least α candidate bit-commitments are hiding. Therefore before the opening phase the receiver sees at most n−α < shares, which give no information about the secret. On the other hand, since at least β candidates of the bit-commitments are binding, the sender is indeed committed to at least β shares. Since α + β > n, i.e., β > n − α, the sharing polynomial, which has degree at most n − α, is uniquely determined by these β shares, and so the commitment to s is also binding. Proof. First assume that the sender and the receiver have a common random string r at their disposal. Later we describe how this additional assumption can be dropped.
Using r, the combiner works as follows: it simulates (p, q)-WOT with p + q ≤ 1 − 1/n by picking each time an input OT-candidate uniformly at random. This is possible, since we are having n candidates, α of which are secure for the sender and β are secure for the receiver, with α+β ≥ n+1. By picking one candidate at random we obtain a probability p ≤ (n−β)/n that the sender learns the receiver's choice, and a probability q ≤ (n − α)/n that the receiver learns both bits input by the sender, hence p + q ≤ ((n − α) + (n − β))/n = (2n − α − β)/n ≤ 1 − 1/n, as required. Given such a (p, q)-WOT, use the (efficient) amplification algorithm of Damgård et al. [DKS99] to obtain a secure OT.
To complete the argument, we have to show how the sender and the receiver can generate a common random string r. It is well-known that OT implies bitcommitment [Cré87] , and bit-commitment implies coin-toss [Blu82] .
8 Therefore, we can convert our n candidate implementation of OT into n candidate implementations of bit-commitment, and then use the bit-commitment-combiner of Lemma 4 to obtain a secure implementation of bit-commitment, provided that α + β > n. This implementation can then be used to implement coin-toss, i.e., the parties can generate a common random string r using the input candidates only, without additional assumptions. Finally, it is easy to verify that all the described protocols use the candidates in a third-party black-box manner, and that the combiner is efficient.
From Lemmas 1 and 5, we get immediately the following theorem about (α, β; n)-robust OT-combiner. 7 In this computation we view bit-strings from {0, 1} m as elements of F2m . 8 For completeness, we describe both protocols in the appendix. 
OT-Combiners Based on the Symmetry of OT
A closer look at the combiners from the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 5 shows that these are "non-uniform" combiners (cf. Sect. 2.2). Namely, the proofs show that for given α, β > 0 with α + β > n there exists a (α, β; n)-robust combiner, i.e., the actions of the combiner are different for different values α, β. (For Lemma 3 it is explicit in the construction, and for Lemma 5 it is due to the fact that the amplification algorithm from [DKS99] makes explicit use of parameters p, q.) More desireable would be an uniform construction, which would have a switched order of quantifiers, i.e., we would like a single combiner that is secure for every α, β > 0 with α + β > n, and would therefore be strictly stronger than any of the special combiners. In this section we show how to construct such a combiner by exploiting the symmetry of OT, i.e., the fact that given OT with sender Alice and receiver Bob, we can perfectly logically reverse it to obtain OT with receiver Alice and sender Bob. That OT can be reversed has first been discovered independently in [CS91, OVY93] . A simpler and more efficient protocol has been proposed in [WW06] .
Our construction is based on a simple trick, which is somehow non-standard, yet plausible in most scenarios: we require that the parties can swap their roles when executing candidate protocols, i.e., any input candidate OT i can be executed in such a way that the sender (of the main OT-protocol) plays the role of the receiver in OT i , and the receiver plays the role of the sender in OT i . Moreover, we require that we have at our disposal multiple copies of each candidate implementation (in particular, our protocols use the candidates both in the original setting as well in the swapped configuration). For example, if the input candidates are given as software packages, these requirements are not a problem, as it means only calling different functions, but if a candidate is given as a pair of physical devices implementing the primitive, the swapping operation can be problematic, as it may require a real physical swap of the corresponding devices. However, it is difficult to come up with a primitive that cannot be swapped or duplicated in principle. Such a primitive would need to make use of some kind of a physical phenomenon, only available to one of the parties, but not to the other.
We use the swapping of the roles in OT -which can be viewed as a "physical" reversal -together with a logical reversal of OT [CS91, OVY93, WW06 ] to obtain an OT in the original direction (from the original sender to the original receiver), but with swapped security properties. More precisely, let swap be this two-step process, i.e., physical swap followed by logical reversal, and consider an implementation OT and its swapped-and-reversed version, OT * = swap(OT). If OT is a correct OT-protocol, then so is OT * . Moreover, if in OT the security of the sender is based on assumption A, and the security of the receiver is based on assumption B, then in OT * we have the opposite situation: the security of the sender is based on assumption B, and the security of the receiver is based on assumption A. In particular, if OT is an implementation unconditionally secure for the sender, then OT * is an implementation unconditionally secure for the receiver.
As a first application of this swapping trick we show a {3; 2}-robust uniform OT-combiner, i.e., a combiner which is simultaneously (α, β; 2)-robust for any α, β satisfying α + β ≥ 3. Recall that if it is known in advance that the security of one party is guaranteed (e.g. α = 2), then the corresponding combiner is very simple [HKN + 05]. However, the combiner for the case α = 2 is quite different from the combiner for the case β = 2, hence these simple combiners are not uniform.
The idea behind our uniform combiner is to use both, the two candidate OT 1 , OT 2 , and their swapped counterparts OT S. Given the symmetry of OT, if the privacy of one party is compromised for one candidate, then the privacy of the other party is compromised for the corresponding swapped candidate. Combining OT 1 , OT 2 , respectively OT * 1 , OT * 2 , with R ensures that the receiver's privacy is protected in both OT and OT , and the sender's privacy in at least one of them. Hence S(OT , OT ) protects the sender from a possible security break of one of the input canditates. Finally, is easy to verify that this is a third-party black-box combiner.
The next lemma gives a general construction to obtain a uniform combiner from a non-uniform one. This construction makes use of the swap-operation, and can be used for combiners of any symmetric two-party primitive.
Lemma 6. If there exists a (k, k; 2n)-robust OT-combiner, then there exists a {k; n}-robust uniform OT-combiner using the swap-operation.
Proof. (sketch)
The (k, n)-robust uniform OT-combiner works as follows: given n candidate instances of OT, satisfying α+β ≥ k, we duplicate all instances, and apply the swap-operation to the duplicates. In this way we obtain 2n candidate instances, where at least k of them are secure for the sender, and at least k are secure for the receiver. Now we can apply the (k, k; 2n)-robust OT-combiner to these 2n instances, and get a secure implementation of OT.
Lemma 6 together with Theorem 1 give us the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any n ≥ 2 and δ > n, there exists a third-party black-box {δ; n}-robust uniform OT-combiner using the swap-operation.
Although the presented uniform OT-combiner works with all OT protocols proposed in the literature, it naturally raises the question whether the role-swapping technique can be dropped. Sommer [Som06] has recently pointed out that for transparent black-box OT-combiners the use of the candidates in the swapped direction is in fact necessary. More precisely, he observed that the impossibility proof of Harnik et al. [HKN + 05] can be adapted to exclude transparent blackbox {3; 2}-robust uniform OT-combiners using the candidates in the prescribed direction only.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We proposed stronger definitions of robust combiners for two-party protocols, which yield robuster, more general combiners for oblivious transfer. The observation that a partially broken candidate implementation can still provide security for one of the parties leads to OT-combiners strictly stronger than the constructions known previously. Furthermore, we have shown that for symmetric two-party primitives even stronger combiners are possible if the parties can swap their roles in the candidate protocols.
As we mentioned above, there is currently a trade-off between the perfect security and the efficiency of a combiner: we do not know whether there exists an efficient (in the number of candidates) perfect uniform OT-combiner. Moreover, it would be interesting to find other settings, in which the introduced swappingtrick could be useful.
